Fourteenth Amendment due-process challenges have usually been rejected so long as license suspension proceedings provide at a minimum:

1. A lawful arrest;

2. A sworn report from the officer;

3. A hearing if requested; and

4. A temporary license until the hearing is provided.

See Mackey v. Montiym, 443 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2612, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1979); Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Supp. 1954). There are, however, isolated cases that have viewed DUI implied consent hearings as "quasi-criminal" in nature, thus requiring somewhat more than the usual minimal administrative safeguards. See, e.g., Heles v. State of South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D. 1982). The Supreme Court of Alaska has ruled that "the same procedural safeguards apply in civil driver's license revocation proceedings for driving while intoxicated as apply in criminal prosecutions for that offense." Barcott v. Department of Public Safety, 741 P.2d 226, 228 (Alaska 1987).

In that case, the appellant faced revocation of his license if his blood-alcohol level was .10 percent or higher. At the hearing, however, he had been precluded from offering evidence concerning the accuracy of the breath machine. In holding that it was a violation of due process to keep him from presenting such evidence, the Supreme Court reasoned that "A driver's license is an important property interest, and the driver has a constitutional right to a meaningful hearing before the state can suspend his license." Id. at 133.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has gone further and held that the revocation of one's driver's license involves a deprivation of a federal "liberty" right. The court, in discussing that the revocation procedures of the DMV satisfy due process, stated: